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Deferred Action: Considering What is Lost
Elizabeth Keyes*
I. INTRODUCTION
This response to Professor Motomura considers what is lost
through the elaboration of formally defined boundaries around
prosecutorial discretion. Professor Motomura and others in this Issue
rightly extol the many benefits of the President's November 2014
executive actions. While I share the view that those benefits are
considerable, I believe a full accounting requires us to consider what
gets lost in this process, including identification of the immigrants in the
limbo space between the actions' prospective beneficiaries at the one
end and those who are priorities for removal on the other. This Essay
focuses on the cost that comes from the loss of a different kind of
discretion in immigration law, where discretionary authority can act as a
corrective measure at the edges of rules, where defined edges bump up
against immigrants in limbo.
Discretion is always an elusive concept: "interstitial," and like the
hole in a doughnut, as Professor Dan Kanstroom has written-defined
more by what is around it than by the space itself.' The less defined the
edges of that space are, the more that space is full of possibility. The
malleability of this space generally cuts against the values of
transparency and accountability that are rightly lauded by many of the
scholars in this symposium Issue. Individualized discretion, guided
generally by policy interests and preferences, and not subject to
carefully drawn limits and clearly defined edges, is indeed anathema to
those values-and yet it serves an important purpose. The discretion
available at the law's margins constitutes a vital means to correct the
errors that inevitably happen at the law's edges, where even the best
* Elizabeth Keyes, Assistant Professor, Director of the Immigrant Rights Clinic, University of
Baltimore School of Law. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; M.P.A., Princeton University;
B.A., Carleton College. The author wishes to thank Hiroshi Motomura and the editors of the
Washburn Law Journal, especially Destiny Bounds, for the invitation to participate in this
symposium, and she thanks Dan Kanstroom, Jayesh Rathod, and Anita Sinha for their helpful
comments as this draft evolved. All errors are her own.
1. Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut Discretion and Deference in
US. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703 (1997).
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rules do an imperfect job of capturing the world's complexity.2 This
kind of remedial, equitable discretion is a kind of discretion that has
been steadily whittled down over the past twenty-five years in
immigration law.
With these recent executive actions, the discretionary space
available for immigrants to make an affirmative case for consideration
has dwindled to near nothing-ness-a phenomenon that should worry
advocates whose clients do not fit within the brightly-lined box set up
for the immigrants deemed most deserving of immigration relief.
Meanwhile, the individualized discretion that remains within the
executive actions points emphatically and uniquely toward removal:
even those eligible for the relief may, as a discretionary matter, be
denied, and even those who do not fit into the enforcement priorities
may be prioritized anyway, discretionarily. This places the executive
actions in a long series of forms of immigration relief that add
discretion, not as a corrective to embrace immigrants, but as yet another
hurdle for immigrants to overcome.
Part II of this Essay begins with a brief consideration of what
discretion means in immigration law, and then turns in Part III to the
three zones, now clearly delineated, that the executive actions created:
the immigrants who are decisively in, decisively out, and decisively
neither. Part IV considers the value of what may be lost with the
executive actions, and concedes that the number of people benefiting
from the executive actions far outstrips the number of people who might
have made affirmative cases for discretion in prior eras. This Part also,
however, compares the actions with the loss two decades ago of another
zone of discretion in immigration law, Judicial Recommendations
Against Deportation ("JRADs"), a loss that seemed unimportant at
that time, but which is broadly regretted today. Part V looks at the ways
that "old fashioned" deferred action-an equitable, loosely defined
zone of discretion that preceded the iterations that this symposium
focuses upon in its pre-DACA and DAPA format-will be under
tremendous pressure from the new executive actions, and concludes that
we need to be careful about what we give up for the sake of a status
which has tremendous immediate usefulness, but which is temporary,
and which may consume resources and political energy better dedicated
to lasting durable reform.
2. A law prohibiting theft of bread is a good law, for example, but readers and fans of Les
Miserables wish Inspector Javert used discretion with that rule as applied to Jean Valjean. Students
staying in their dormitories at night during dangerous times is another excellent rule, but Harry
Potter eaders generally appreciate Professor McGonagall's use of discretion in enforcing these rules
more than they appreciate Dolores Umbridge's faithful upholding of the rule.
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II. DISCRETION, BRIEFLY
Deferred action is a form of prosecutorial discretion, but its nature
is changing as it shifts from the loosely defined "old fashioned" deferred
action into carefully-drawn Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
("DACA") and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and LPRs
("DAPA"). 3 Dan Kanstroom developed an important typology of
discretion twenty years ago that remains valuable and insightful today to
understand this shift.4  Referring to Ronald Dworkin's work, he
described discretion as being "the hole in the doughnut" -a hole which
"does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of
restriction."' 5 Phil Torrey, of Harvard's Immigration and Refugee
Clinic, discusses another image of the elusive concept:
Discretion has been described as a "flexible shock absorber." It gives
judges authority to administer justice that reflects the specific
circumstances of an individual case. When exercised properly, discretion
produces a fair result in accordance with the intent of lawmakers.
6
Kanstroom found discretion within immigration law in numerous places,
from formally delegated discretion (delegated from Congress to the
Executive), to heavily individualized discretion (found in individual case
adjudications), and his analysis of these and more forms of discretion
integrated the sometimes outlying field of immigration law with
overarching conceptions of discretion in the law.
7
Of most interest to me in this Essay is the discretion Kanstroom
termed "residual" discretion.8 Residual discretion exists in the space
where statues and rules have not made all outcomes fully pre-
determined, whether through broadly written rules or use of words that
required significant further interpretation.9 Residual discretion is not a
blank slate for rewriting laws, but rather a tool of leniency that
adjudicators can deploy where a rote reading of a rule seems to create
an inequitable result. The small and declining availability of such
discretion in immigration law has been rued by many scholars, from the
harsh mandatory detention provision o to the removal of discretionary
3. See Part IV., infra.
4. Kanstroom, supra note 1.
5. Id. at 711.
6. Philip L. Torrey, The Erosion of Judicial Discretion in Cime-Based Removal Proceedings,
14-02 Immigr. Briefings 1 (2014) (quoting Daniel K. Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The
REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the "Rule" of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 161, 162
(2007)).
7. Kanstroom, supra note 1.
8. Id. at 717-27.
9. "When exercised 'properly,' discretion, on this view, means the residue of rule-based legal
practice; that which cannot be accounted for under the 'core' system of law which is primarily seen as
one of definable rules which seek to govern abstractly and in advance of a particular dispute."
Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 719.
10. See Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immrgration
2015]
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waivers for lawful permanent residents facing crime-based removal.1
Deferred action used to be an excellent example of residual discretion,
but the transparency and clarity of the executive actions shrinks this
residual space radically.
III. THE BORDERS AROUND LIMBO
The November 2014 memos clearly defined two important sets of
immigrants -those able to benefit from deferred action and those who
constituted enforcement priorities. Over-simplifying greatly, the former
are beneficiaries of the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien
Minors Act ("DREAMers") and parents of U.S. citizens and permanent
residents,12 and the latter are named as threats to public safety and
recent or significant immigration violators. 13 This Part will look at the
function of discretion for each, before turning to the unnamed third
group, comprising the millions of immigrants who are neither "in" nor
''out."
A. In: The Beneficiaries of the NewDeferredAction
With DACA and DAPA, deferred action now has substantive
meaning, with a set of clear criteria defining who is and who is not
eligible for the status. The eligibility requirements for each program
differ, but contain bright-line criteria such as age at entry, status of
qualifying relative, length of time in the United States, and so forth-
criteria that have little to no ambiguity, and thus help create the bright
line surrounding the category.
Interestingly, both DACA and DAPA also retain a discretionary
element that narrows the space within the zone of eligibility. 14 The
discretion that remains is the discretion to deny applicants who meet all
eligibility requirements to the letter, not the discretion to grant in case
of missing one or more eligibility requirements, such as someone who
Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363 (2014).
11. See Maritza I. Reyes, Constitutiona'Yzing Immigration Law: The Vital Role of Judicial
Discretion in the Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents, 84 TEMP. L. REv. 637,658 (2012).
12. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., on Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and
with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents
(Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_ memo_deferred_action.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2K3L-CMML] [hereinafter DAPA Memorandum].
13. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., on Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/pubications/14_.1120_memo-prosecutorialdiscretion.pdf
[http://perma.cc/VLV3-PVED] [hereinafter Priority Enforcement Memorandum].
14. DAPA Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5 ("[llmmigration officers will be provided with
specific eligibility criteria for deferred action, but the ultimate judgment as to whether an immigrant
is granted deferred action will be determined on a case-by-case basis.").
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entered a month past his sixteenth birthday (in the case of DACA), or a
parent of a U.S. Citizen who falls weeks short of the length of U.S.
physical presence required.15 This residual discretion softens the bright
line somewhat, but in a negative direction for the potential beneficiaries:
discretion can only be used to take the benefit away, not to bestow it.
Roughly five million people are eligible for DACA or DAPA,
according to the Migration Policy Institute.16 The actual number of
recipients of deferred action through these programs is likely to be
somewhat, or perhaps significantly, lower. Experience with past
legalization programs-which offered considerably greater long-term
benefits-and with the original DACA, shows that a significant
percentage of those eligible are unlikely to apply. Eligible participants
may not apply because of financial reasons (a major factor in the 1986
legalization),17 or fear of the uncertain deferred action status (a factor
with DACA, where fees were also a factor). 18 Another percentage,
probably very small, will be eligible but denied for discretionary
reasons. 19
B. Out: Trying to Define the Most Undesirable Immigrants
At the other end of the now clear priorities are those for whom
removal will be much more likely-the top two priorities announced in
the November 2014 memo establishing the Priority Enforcement
Program ("PEP"). PEP concerns itself with immigrants who have any
of a series of crime-related convictions (aggravated felony, state felony
or gang-related convictions, three or more misdemeanor convictions, or
a single significant misdemeanor conviction), those suspected of
terrorism, and those with recent immigration violations (since January 1,
2014).20 The Migration Policy Institute estimates that these priorities
15. Professor Wadhia's contribution to this Issue notes how these denials "continued to flow."
See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The President and Deportation: DA CA, DAPA, and the Sources and
Limits of Executive Authority, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 189, 195 (2015).
16. MPI Releases Detailed Data Profiles of Unauthorized Immigrants and Estimates of
Deferred Action Populations for Top U.S. Counties, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., (Jan. 15, 2015),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/mpi-releases-detailed-county-profiles-unauthorized-
immigrants-and-estimates-deferred-action [http://perma.cc/GV38-RFNK] [hereinafter "MPI Data
Profiles"].
17. See Betsy Cooper & Kevin O'Neil, Lessons From the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., (Aug. 2005), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/lessons-
immigration-reform-and-control-act-1986 [http://perma.cc/G7K3-8TNJI .
18. See generally, Elizabeth Keyes, Race and Immigration, Then and Now: How the Shift to
'Worthiness' Undermines the 1965 Immigration Law's Civil Rights Goals, 57 HOWARD L.J. 900
(2014).
19. No statistics are yet available, but through informal polls of immigration attorneys, thus far
no one who has received a discretionary denial has been informed of the reason for that denial. The
National Immigration Project is developing a report on this phenomenon, but it has not yet been
published.
20. Priority Enforcement Memorandum, supra note 13.
2015]
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capture approximately thirteen percent of the undocumented
population, which would comprise roughly 1.5 million people.
21
While all of this may sound entirely safe from critique, the rhetoric
overstates the value of what it captures.22 First, it is vital to note how
these categories over-encompass those groups who have
disproportionate contact with the criminal justice system, including
immigrants of color.23 Second, these priorities also focus on the families
(especially children) who arrived from Central America seeking refuge
in 2014. It is almost certainly true within this group of 1.5 million people
that there are many sympathetic cases-often involving vulnerable
children or past-offenders who have shown significant rehabilitation.
But the clarity of this "out" box removes any such equities from
consideration.
Furthermore, Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") has
been clear that while its resources are directed to identifying and
removing those within the first two priorities, it retains discretion to
remove others "of interest.' 24 This discretion is a perfect counterpoint
to that residual discretion left with DACA/DAPA: it is the discretion to
add to the group of excluded. And of course, the discretion in this
context also points in the direction of removability. Where DACA and
DAPA create an initial set of people seemingly eligible for inclusion,
and then discretionarily ejects some from that group, PEP creates an
initial set of people prioritized for exclusion, and then discretionarily
adds to the group.
C. Limbo: The Lost Middle
Definable only by not being in either of these two groups are an
estimated 4.5 million undocumented residents of the United States.
25
We know they lack serious criminal convictions, and we know they
either do not have U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident ("LPR")
21. MPI Data Profiles, supra note 16.
22. I have critiqued the easy reliance on overly-simplified and often misleading narratives of
"good" and "bad" immigrants in my earlier work. See generally Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and
Sinners.- Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the US. Immigration System, 26 GEO.
IMMIGR. L. J. 207 (2012). For a deep analysis of the specific ways in which terminology in
immigration law suffers from inaccuracy to the detriment of immigrants, see Emily Torstveit Ngara,
Aliens, Aggravated Felons and Worse: When Words Breed Fear and Fear Breads Injustice, 11 STANr.
J.C.R. & C.L. (forthcoming 2016).
23. See Jason A. Cade, The Plea Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751 (2013); Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The Dream Act, Immigration
Reform and Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101 (2013).
24. Priority Enforcement Memorandum, supra note 13.
25. This estimate draws on the widely-used figure of 11 million undocumented immigrants in
the United States. With 5 million benefiting from DAPA or DACA, and 1.5 million falling into
enforcement priorities, that leaves 4.5 million in limbo. As noted above, because fewer than 5 million
are likely to actually benefit from DAPA or DACA, the limbo population is probably greater than
this-but I will conservatively leave the estimate at 4.5 million.
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children, or have not lived long enough in the United States to qualify
for DACA or DAPA. What we know affirmatively about them is far
less clear, except that they likely range across a broad spectrum of
nationalities and levels of ties to the United States through employment,
children in U.S. schools, U.S. citizen relatives other than children, and
so forth.
Since the boxes of those who are "in" or "out" both have policy
justifications (whether one agrees with those justifications or not), one
logical conclusion is that perhaps the limbo zone that holds those who
are neither in nor out is equally justifiable. Yet at the edges of the
limbo zone we can perceive what the loss of individualized discretion
means. Legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart understood that even the most
ambitious bright-line rules needed to leave space for issues that can only
be "appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete case."'26 In
that spirit, and to put forward a more affirmative view of who those in
limbo are, rather than who they are not, I offer the following brief
concrete case:
Miguel 27 came legally to the United States from Brazil at age 17. The
day after he arrived, he set to work as day laborer outside a large home
construction store, starting a pattern of working 10 hour days for as many
days as he could find work. Despite the physical demands of the work, he
also made his way to a GED registration center, and began studying for
his GED in the evenings and at Saturday classes-taking two buses each
way to do so. Education was (and remains) the single most important
thing to Miguel, and after getting his GED he enrolled in community
college, all the while working for his cousin. His initial visa had long since
expired, so Miguel had become part of the U.S. undocumented
population. He did so well with his community college courses that a
four-year university offered him an academic scholarship to help him
complete his bachelor's degree, which he did-summa cum laude. From
there, a full scholarship to a prestigious graduate program followed.
With no criminal convictions, Miguel is not a priority for removal. Yet
he does not qualify for any form of relief under the November 2012
executive actions announced by President Obama. He has no child
(therefore not DAPA eligible) and came a year too late to qualify for
DACA. When he recently applied for "old-fashioned" deferred action,
DHS denied his application.
28
Miguel is among the 4.5 million in limbo. So is the construction
worker who has been here since 2003, who lives with his American
girlfriend, and works two jobs, but has not had a child because he wants
to be more economically stable first. Or the home health-care aide
26. Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 722 (quoting H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127 (1961)).
27. Miguel's story is real; I have only changed his name and country of origin.
28. See generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The History of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REv. 1285 (2015). Deferred action as it has existed in the law since
the 1970s, but not constrained by the eligibility requirements of DAPA or DACA. id.
2015]
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whose U visa application has been caught in a lengthy agency backlog,
who is struggling to support her two non-LPR children. Or the
grandmother who brought her grandson away from gang violence in
Honduras in 2013-although she has a U.S. citizen daughter, she has not
been here long enough to qualify for DAPA. The stories go on and on,
and are fairly typical of the clients I know who fall into this immigration
limbo, a limbo with now starkly clear borders. Indeed, very few of my
clients qualify for either program, and the existence of DACA/DAPA
shrinks the discretionary space to make an effective case for any of
these people whose compelling equities might have made for effective
deferred action cases in the past.
DACA/DAPA certainly overlaps with and captures many of the
attributes that we value in our immigration policy (as defined by the
laws themselves, and the conversations and debates around reform
which exhorted that the immigrants be law-abiding, with an enduring
presence in the country, and strong connections to the community).
29
But it is by no means clear that someone who happens to have a U.S.
citizen child captures the more complicated set of variables that make
up the desired immigrant population. Indeed, if Miguel had a child
instead of focusing on his education, he would be DAPA eligible, but
does society only value him with a child, and not with his educational
excellence? Surely not. Are all parents necessarily the embodiment of
immigrants we want to stay? Again, surely not (although DAPA can
alternately be seen as a policy response to the needs of the citizen and
lawful permanent resident children, not to their parents). America has
long valued family ties in setting immigration priorities, but not
exclusively, and certainly not exclusively the parent-child tie, important
though it is.30 As the only game in town for the undocumented
population, DACA and DAPA powerfully state whose relief is more
urgent, and whose is not. And if these new executive actions either take
the pressure off broader reform or set up a framework for more durable
reform in the future, this problem of under- and over-exclusivity will
become even more problematic.
Furthermore, while some individuals in removal proceedings could
point to murkier enforcement priorities to justify a request for deferred
action (something that can be granted only if it is of value to the
government, as in the case of someone whose removal proceeding or
29. See generally, HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006). Professor Motomura has previously
written about how immigration laws over the years have variously captured these and other values
and visions society has for immigrants. Id.
30. Angela M. Banks, The Normative and Istorical Cases for Proportional Deportation, 62
EMORY L.J. 1243, 1298 (2013) Angela Banks has explored the limits of citizenship as a proxy for
connection and commitment to the United States, calling it "an imperfect proxy." Id.
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actual removal would require governmental resources) now, individuals
who fall outside those two priorities are very clearly not priorities for
removal, and therefore ICE has no incentive to agree to requests for
deferred action.31 Advocates are concerned that their clients who have
been renewing the work permits they had been receiving for years under
deferred action will now be denied those work permits in the future
since, despite being removable, they are no longer priorities for
removal.
32
IV. DEFERRED ACTION UNDER PRESSURE
DACA and DAPA do not replace "old-fashioned" deferred
action-the deferred action that has been utilized for at least four
decades-yet their existence may radically change deferred action's
availability in practice, because the executive actions have considerable
expressive power. The actions communicate that the Administration's
preferred recipients of discretion are the people eligible for DACA and
DAPA, and by implication, others are less preferred, or perhaps
entirely undesired.
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia has written, "In theory, any person who
is in the United States without authorization may apply for deferred
action before any component of DHS, including CBP, ICE, and
USCIS.' ' 33 Denials of deferred action have always been unreviewable;
bureaucratically this makes denial fairly painless.34 Enforcement bias
and workloads within DHS may also tip officials toward denial, as Jason
Cade has demonstrated for prosecutorial discretion generally, of which
deferred action is a very specific sub-part.35 Despite these pressures,
prior to the executive actions, ICE approved just under half of the
roughly seven hundred applications for deferred action that it
processed -a very reasonable percentage for a discretionary remedy. 36
This possibility of a grant of deferred action still exists in theory.
For one small subgroup of the 5.5 million in limbo, they will likely
31. One local ICE office confirmed this at a lunch discussion between ERO officers and AILA
chapter members in Baltimore, July 30, 2015 (on file with author).
32. Id. Jason Cade notes that this limbo zone actually constitutes another zone of discretion-
the discretion not to enforce the zone members' removal. Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration
Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661 (2015). This is true, and the zone consequently benefits from
better treatment than those in the "out" box, targeted for deportation. Nonetheless, the ability of
any individual member of this limbo zone to seek a discretionary improvement in their status-the
deferred action discussed in the following section-is sharply limited.
33. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency
in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H.L. REV. 1, 7 (2012) (emphasis added).
34. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, My Great FOJA Adventure and Discoveries of Deferred Action
Cases at IC, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 345, 348 (2013).
35. Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TuL. L.




succeed: those in removal proceedings whose cases are administratively
closed while they have applications pending (such as for asylum,
cancellation of removal, or other forms of relief). Yet, small as the
discretionary space for individual deferred action was before, there is
reason to fear that for most of the 5.5 million in limbo, that small space
is under even greater pressure and now likely to shrink further. Unless
advocates push for full use of the old-fashioned deferred action, to
remind officials that this power still exists, a government official may be
cautious and hesitant to go beyond the expressly stated preferences
found in DACA and DAPA.
As noted above, even those who fit within the DACA and DAPA
lines may be denied as a matter of discretion, which communicates that
this deferred action status is one that should be given in a limited,
cautious way. Immigrants like Miguel might have been able to put
forward a compelling claim for deferred action in the pre-2012 era, but if
their situations fall beyond the lines set by DACA and DAPA,
government officials have an easy basis for denial that is, again, an
entirely safe decision for them to make because it is not reviewable.
37
Beyond the explicit preferences stated with DACA and DAPA,
the executive actions fit within the historical trend toward discretion as
an extra hurdle for immigrants to clear, instead of discretion being a
point of access. Congress famously removed much of the delegated
discretion through the 1990s, stripping courts of review powers,
eliminating judicial ability to adjust outcomes in compelling cases,
mandating detention, removing waivers of removal, and so forth.
Indeed, where discretion continued within the statute, its expressive
purpose was very clearly to limit relief-for example, in asylum, or in
cancellation of removal-the judge's discretion is an additional hurdle
for applicants, not a way for a judge to make up for some deficiency in
the applicant's ability to meet the other statutory requirements. In
commenting on changes over time, Professor Kanstroom quotes
Kenneth Davis as saying, "The underlying scheme of the Act is to avoid
conferring legal rights on aliens.'38 With such forces arrayed against the
use of discretion, reasserting its value is going to become ever more
important for immigrant advocates.
V. WHY THIS MATTERS
A fair critique of this Essay is that this lost discretion only matters
as a theoretical issue. After all, deferred action in the pre-2014 era of
37. The real Miguel's case was, indeed, denied.
38. Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 752 (quoting 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE. L.
TREATISE § 6 (2d ed. 1979)).
[Vol. 55
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less definition and less clarity occupied a statistically tiny place in
immigration law.39 Professor Wadhia has noted how, to the extent we
can know the statistics with any certainty, only several hundred people
benefited from deferred action in a typical yearA0 Weighing a few
hundred people against the millions who will benefit from DACA and
DAPA, it is enough to make this Essay seem spectacularly ungrateful.
And yet, something important is being lost, beyond even the
humanitarian concern we might have for many of the immigrants in the
limbo space.41 While deferred action was under-utilized in the pre-
DACA and DAPA era, it represented the possibility of equitable relief
in an otherwise highly regulated system, and it is a loss we may rue in
the future. Here the history of JRADs may be instructive. The JRAD
history begins with an acknowledged need for discretion in a harsh
system, continues through a period of uneven use of the discretionary
power, and is followed by elimination of the power.42 The JRAD
history ends with regret for its absence.
JRADs offered the sentencing judge in criminal court the ability to
determine whether the individual should (as a matter of discretion) be
deported.43 As the 1917 legislative history explains:
When the alien is before the judge charged with a crime and the time for
sentence comes, necessarily the question of whether he shall be deported
or not must be presented to the court, and when all the facts are before
him, and both sides have been heard by the court, that is the time when
that important matter should be decided.44
This is a prime example of individualized discretion, unfettered by
the kinds of criteria we see with DACA or DAPA. The JRAD
definition cites no criteria, and has only one later-added exclusion
(JRADs were made unavailable for narcotics convictions).45 Instead, it
focuses on the procedure of judicial decision-making to recommend
against deportation after putting interested parties (immigration
authorities, the prosecutor, and so forth) on notice so that they might
39. See, Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, My Great FOIA Adventure and Discoveries of Deferred
Action Cases at ICE, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 345 (2013).
40. Id
41. This limbo matters all the more because legislative immigration reform efforts have
indefinitely stalled, which means DAPA and DACA are the only significant option available for
addressing the needs of the undocumented population.
42. Supra Part 1.
43. See Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge,
51 EMORY L.J. 1131 (2002).
44. Id.at 1131 (quoting 53 Cong. Rec. 5171 (1916) (statement of Rep. Hayes) (speaking about
the Immigration Act of 1917)).
45. Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, ch. 629, § 301(b), (c), 70 Stat. 651 (July 25,
1956). See generally Torrey, supra note 6. This exclusion was added to the JRAD provision in 1956,
and shows yet another example of immigration amendments limiting discretion over time, confirming
the view of Dan Kanstroom and Kenneth Davis that the underlying scheme points toward removal.
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weigh in.46 Thus, like pre-2014 deferred action, we see a broad
authority with minimal substantive guidance.
The provision was little known, and relatively seldom invoked, as
Margaret Taylor and Ronald Wright have shown.47 Their 2002 article,
which argued for a merger between criminal and immigration
sentencing, looked at this JRAD history in great detail.48 They note
how, for much of its existence since 1917, JRADs operated in a context
where deportations of immigrants for crime-related reasons were very
low, and therefore the need for JRADs was lower.49 The authors note
that, "[p]erhaps the most notable feature of JRADs was the extent to
which 'the existence of this remedy and its tremendous ameliorating
effect ... was neither widely known nor understood.' -50 Much like pre-
2014 deferred action, then, this was a provision that had relatively little
real-world impact.
In 1990, after seventy-three years in the law, Congress removed the
provision allowing for JRADs.51 This removal was an unheralded
moment in immigration law at the time, and the provision disappeared
without a trace of legislative history explaining its departure.52 Perhaps
its under-use contributed to this silence; it was a tree that did not fall in
a forest, making it irrelevant whether we could hear it or not. It is this
irrelevance that I had in mind as I considered the sheer numbers of
46. Taylor & Wright, supra note 43, at 1143 ("Former 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2)(1988) read as
follows: 'The provisions of subsection (a)(4) [the moral turpitude ground] respecting the deportation
of an alien convicted of a crime or crimes shall not apply... (2) if the court sentencing such aliens for
such crimes shall make, at the time of first imposing judgment or passing sentence, or within thirty
days thereafter, a recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien not be deported, due
notice having been given prior to making such recommendation to representatives of the interested
State, the Service, and prosecution authorities, who shall be granted an opportunity to make
representations in the matter.' ") (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1988), repealed bylmmigration Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978).
47. Taylor & Wright, supra note 43. The level of usage varied considerably by jurisdiction,
however. Jason A. Cade, Return of the JRAD, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 25 (2015).
48. Taylor & Wright, supra note 43. While beyond the scope of this Essay, their argument is
extremely interesting:
The government would benefit if the sentencing judge functioned as an immigration judge
because the sentencing investigation would provide a reliable way to identify more
deportable offenders. A merger of sentencing and immigration determinations would also
yield less duplication of resources, quicker deportation, and-notably- lower detention
costs. Deportable offenders would also benefit from quicker resolution of their claims,
shorter detentions, the institutionalized use of prosecutorial discretion for immigration
decisions, the presence of a neutral judge, and the provision of counsel and the other
procedural protections of the criminal system.
Id. at 1132-33. The idea is worth revisiting, with integration of the substantial critical race critiques
that have been written in the interim about the ways the criminal justice system works to the
detriment of, in particular, immigrants of color.
49. Id. at 1149-50. They write, "Fewer than one thousand noncitizen offenders were deported
each year for most of the period that JRADs were available. With this level of enforcement, the
JRAD option was not widely known among criminal defense attorneys." Id.
50. Id at 1148 (quoting DAN KESSELBRENNER AND LORY ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND CRIMES, App. G-4 (Norton Tooby updating ed., 2001)).
51. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
52. Taylor & Wright, supra note 43, at 1150-51.
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DACA and DAPA eligible people as compared to the limited use of
deferred action in the pre-DACA and DAPA era.
However, in hindsight, as the 1990s dramatically increased the
intersection between the criminal justice system and immigration
enforcement, the departure of JRADs has been rued.53 Now scholars
see it as an underutilized discretionary tool whose usefulness would
have boomed in the over-criminalized post-1996 era.5 4 As advocates
grapple with the fate of 4.5 million or more immigrants in limbo post-
2014, it is possible that we will similarly regret the narrowing, and
functional elimination, of the tool of deferred action.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Essay has attempted to provide a counterpoint to the strong
value, so powerfully set forth by Professor Motomura and others in this
Issue, of establishing more transparent criteria for the exercise of
discretion. There is no denying the enormous increase in numbers of
people who will benefit from the more clearly promulgated exercise of
discretion, and I share my fellow authors' views of the value of clarity.
As a practicing lawyer with more tools in her immigration toolbox, I
also look forward to finally providing relief to at least a few of my
clients who have not had effective ways through the immigration system
to date. These clients are the ones who are "in," for whom the clarity of
lines around prosecutorial discretion is wholly positive.
Yet, stories like Miguel's hint at one cost of brightening the lines
chosen around DACA and DAPA. The residual discretion available
for immigrants like Miguel is under intense pressure following the
executive actions, and it is an important, valuable, and rare space within
the immigration law. The loss matters for these immigrants all the more
because legislative immigration reform efforts have indefinitely stalled,
which means DACA and DAPA are the only significant option
available for addressing the needs of the undocumented population. In
an age where, now, the paths to immigration status are so circumscribed,
narrow, and easily lost, it is an even sharper cost to narrow this
interstitial land where people like Miguel-true heirs to America's
53. Id. See also Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court,
34 CARDOzO L. REV. 1751, 1762 (2013); Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better Than the Sum: A Case
for the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEo.
IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 308 (2012) ("Criminal justice actors can make deportability decisions today, but
they can act in favor of removal only."); Torrey supra note 6.
54. Taylor and Wright call for a return, with modifications, of the JRAD provision as a way of
achieving their merger goals. Taylor & Wright, supra note 43, at 1175-76; see also Cade, supra note
47 (calling for "nonstatutory JRADs"); Stephen Lee, Do Facto Inigration Courts, 101 CAL. L.
REV. 553, 598 (2013) ("Although a fuller treatment of this issue is better left for another day, the
Court's reference to JRADs raises an intriguing alternative to the current prosecutor-centered world
of de facto immigration courts.").
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immigration mythology -could have found their way.
There may also be a political cost. Deferred action is nobody's
favorite immigration status-indeed, it is more of a "non-status status,"
and while it delivers employment authorization, it leads to nothing more
durable. Immigrants may be rightly thrilled to receive employment
authorization, but they often find that the temporariness of it makes
employers unwilling to hire them, fearing that they will be hiring
someone who needs to be dismissed a year, or two, or three down the
road. In the meantime, it does not provide any basis for them to seek
reunification with children or other close family members they have
often left behind.
Durable immigration status is still the goal, but immigration
reform, when it happens, appears to be on an increasingly elongated
timeframe. Despite that, DACA and DAPA (when they are ultimately
permitted to go forward) may create a sense of relief that we have done
something about he problem, which could soften the winds in the sails
of the already slow immigration reform boat. Advocates and scholars
can and should celebrate what these programs do accomplish, but we
must ultimately demand something much better than the deal we are
getting: immigration reform and the restoration of some degree of
discretion at the points in the law where well-defined rules meet the
individuals who show those rules' limitations.
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